THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Anthony D'Amato ABSTRACT. A coherent theory of international law would have explanatory power. It should indicate where international rules come from, how they are changed, and how they are enforced. The theory could usefully employ theoretical advances from other disciplines, such as systems theory, nperson games, network theory, emergence, complexity, and inference to the best explanation.
As international law gains prominence in global discourse, its detractors claim all the louder that if it were really law, it would have an explanatory theory. The theory would explain what international law is, where it comes from, and why and how it constrains state behavior. Their criticisms have put traditional scholars on the defensive.
They agree, perhaps too readily, that their subject is characterized by a cacophony of partial theories that seem to go in different directions. At a recent symposium, nearly all participants agreed that international law is ineluctably fragmented.
1 They despaired of ever seeing a theory that could glue all the pieces together. Perhaps, some suggest, international law is inherently pluralistic. Yet clearly pluralism at the basic level of theory is likely to be an excuse for incoherence. of reductionism within the classic tradition. They view international law as primarily a discourse which can be deconstructed to reveal the antithetical argumentative positions of the competing states that gave rise to the rule. Koskenniemi locates the antagonistic forces at opposite ends of a spectrum, which he labels apology and utopia. Apologists base their contentions on raw state practice. Utopians add norms (morality, justice, security) that transcend the empirical data.
Although provocative on an academic level, it is hard to see how the
Koskenniemi-Kennedy reductionism would be of any help to international lawyers. 6 Koskenniemi himself concedes the impracticality of his theory. Not only is his theory too abstract, but even on its own terms all international legal discourse surely takes place in between apology and utopia. Neither side would want to move too closely to either of the polar extremes for fear of conceding the majority of the spectral space to the other side.
3 See Myres S. McDougal, Studies in World Public Order 778 (1960) . 4 See Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (1989) . 5 See David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1987) . 6 Professor Kennedy candidly reveals an incident early in his teacing career at Harvard Law School when Professor Abram Chayes came "bursting into my office to declaim, 'why would you want to deconstruct international law, we've hardly got it constructed yet.'" David Kennedy, Tom Franck and the Manhattan School, 35 Int'l L. & Pol. 397, 426 (2003 Trimble, John Carter, Jack Goldsmith, and Eric Posner offer an easy way out. They argue that there is no need for a theory inasmuch as international law has no independent force. The only forceful thing in international relations is force, not law.
American legal realism goes back to the academic debates of the 1920s and 1930s
when it was argued that law is just a mask for power. But legal realism eventually ran out of steam because of its failure to generate a research agenda. Once mainstream scholars agreed with the realists that power influences law, there was little more to say.
Power, along with morality and fairness, are generally viewed as exogenous to the legal system. But within the legal system-for example, in the discourse that takes place in a courtroom-the attorney who spends time arguing from power is implicitly conceding that she does not have good legal arguments to fill the space. Or, in a negotiation, the side that claims it should win because it is more powerful is not appealing to a neutral principle that has any possibility of inducing the other side to yield argumentative ground. Only rules of law-accepted ex ante as impersonal and neutral-have a chance of mediating between opposed political adversaries in a courtroom or around a negotiation table.
7
As legal realism was overstaying its welcome in domestic jurisprudence, a few scholars saw an opportunity to make hay in the then marginal field of international law.
Myres McDougal, a legal realist specializing in property law at Yale during the 1930s, decided during the war years that he could effectuate an international-law power grab.
One of his core theses was that an international rule is nothing more than a helpful guide to relevant decisional factors for officials whose job it is to project state power into the international arena. This struck some of his international listeners as a new idea, just as its resuscitation by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner has received the attention often accorded to a new idea. 8 Perhaps to Goldsmith and Posner it was a new idea; their footnotes and indices betray no awareness of McDougal's voluminous writings.
The classical realists, Machiavelli and Hobbes, believed that rulers of states (the Prince, the Leviathan) wrote the laws to serve their own interests and then revised them whenever they found the old ones to be inconvenient. But neither Machiavelli nor Hobbes went so far as to claim that the laws on the books should be differentially interpreted in favor of the more powerful party. For although the Prince could change the law whenever it suited him, the law that was in place-so long as it remained in placeapplied just as much to him and his close friends as it applied to his subjects. Yet
McDougal's student W. Michael Reisman has taken the step that was too radical for Machiavelli and Hobbes. Inasmuch as Reisman's voluminous writings are so highly contextualized, qualified, and nuanced, their operative message often has to be dug out. Posner said in a recent debate, speaking for himself and Goldsmith, "The first point that we want to make is that the government should never comply with international law just for the sake of international legality." Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg responded that the Goldsmith-Posner conception "is not law in anything other than the most misleading way."
12 Indeed, if we substitute "international strategies" for "international law," the Goldsmith-Posner project would probably commend itself to a broad spectrum of viewpoints. But the punch-line would vanish, for Goldsmith-Posner insist that international law is not congruent with international strategy without telling us what the difference in the two terms might possibly be. In short, their claim has become controversial just because they have by fiat defined international law as international strategy.
Is the reason for the high visibility of the legal realists their apparent ability to take a jurisprudentially discredited idea and use it to put traditional international scholars on the defensive? If so, traditional scholars of international law need to respond. 
C. CONSTRUCTING A THEORY
To respond by criticizing legal realism is not enough. An affirmative defense is needed. Scholars of international law need to construct a theory that explains why international law is law, where it comes from, how it is proved up, and how it works.
Here are eight signposts along the route to a comprehensive theory:
1. Evolutionary epistemology. The previously-noted failures of deductivism and reductionism in effect say that the rules of international law were not handed down to
Grotius from a mountaintop but rather slowly emerged as societies evolved. When the early nomadic hunter-gatherers gradually settled into sedentary agricultural communities, group interactions gave rise to certain legal rules that were found to be useful in Machiavelli and Hobbes, the definition of law was precisely a mechanism for regulating power. But the opposite is not true: power cannot "regulate" law because power is a brute-force instrument lacking an inherent regulatory structure. Indeed, Machiavelli took the analysis further, arguing that the Prince's personal power is enhanced by the rule of law. For it is of limited value to a Prince or Leviathan to be the strongest person in the jungle; his power will not extend much beyond his fists. But where a population respects a set of Type I rules, the Prince or Leviathan may achieve vast power. True, they have to follow the law that is on the books until they decide to change it (in order to reassure their subjects that the law is doing its job of regulating power), but this is a trivial cost compared to the power benefit that they derive from law in consequence of its ability to radiate out and control public behavior on a large scale.
Power is formally harnessed in the service of law only when a person or a state decides not to respect a Type I rule. Then law-enforcers, operating under Type II rules, use their physical power to coerce people into obeying the Type I rules or to punish them for disobedience. This works the same way in international law as it does in domestic law and is indeed the underappreciated key to the proof that international law is real. A theory of international law would be qualitatively strengthened by going beyond the simple bilateralism employed by Goldsmith and Posner. 16 Just the addition of state C makes it theoretically possible to separate the strategic injury from the legal injury. For with C as a player, the new triangular matrix can assign different weights to the two types of injuries. This follows from the fact that in any given dispute between 16 Goldsmith and Posner use two-person game theory to try to prove that international law is just politics. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra n.8. Although they do not deny that there are more than two states in the world, they retrofit most of their real-world examples into a two-person game, a game of United States vs. Everyone Else. However, it is clear that their choice of two-person game theory assumes the very result they believe they have proved-that international rules can be wholly deconstructed into power-strategic choices.
two out of three players, the third state may not wish to make a political choice between A or B although it may want to secure its own interest in the integrity of the rule.. (To be sure, a third state could also have a strategic interest similar to the British game of balance-of-power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Whenever two political coalitions formed on the continent, Great Britain would align itself diplomatically with the militarily weaker coalition.) In our posited A-B dispute, it is reasonable to suppose that C has a distinct interest in rule-preservation for, after all, C bought into that rule in the first place. Hence, other things equal, we may expect C to come to the legal support of B by bringing diplomatic pressure on A to desist from breaking the rule. Thus, A's calculation to break the rule must assign distinct weights to the likely opposition of both B and C. This can add considerably to A's expected cost of breaking the rule and in some cases deter A from doing so.
17
Although a third player may be necessary to champion the cause of rules in an international legal system, it may not always be sufficient. When state A decides to seize one of B's vessels, A may already be counting on some kind of political hold over C that makes it unlikely that C will stand up for the preservation of the legal rule. Thus although C's entrance into the world introduced the possibility of its playing the role of rule-enforcer, there is no guarantee that C will actually accept that responsibility. The best thing to do from the viewpoint of world order is to add more players. As D, E, F, and G enter the world, there are more entities that may each or in combination perceive and A is quiet about it while B publicly flouts his violation. It is universally known that the police and prosecutors will expend far more resources in tracking down and incarcerating B. They do so because B, by openly violating one rule, has attacked and injured the integrity of the network of rules. 20 20 A network of legal rules is a non-scalar network. The relation between rules is measured by a power law rather than by a Bell-curve distribution. These characteristics give rise to an additional useful heuristic. We may predict that the set of legal rules, like any non-scalar network, sets up an inverse power-law relation between the magnitude and frequency of rule violations . (Earthquakes are analogous: earthquakes measuring 6 on the Richter scale are twice as powerful as those measuring 3, but they occur only half as often.) As the legal system gains experience in dealing with minor rule violations that do not risk a world war, then when rarer major violations come along, lines of communication and procedures of diplomatic adjustment are in place and can be extended to those (less frequent) major violations. Over time, a smooth gradient is established that can reduce the disruptiveness of violations. The relative ease of repairing minor violations thus promotes overall systemic stability. In turn, the stability itself recursively makes it easier to repair major rule violations.
While Type I rules of the system differ from each other at their own level, what connects them into a network is their equally potential selection as candidates for reprisals at the Type II level.
7. Reprisals. After repeating his famous thesis that a legal rule must always be coercive, Hans Kelsen in 1948 argued that coercion in international law takes the form of forcible reprisals. 21 A state that commits a delict (a violation of a Type I rule) thus may legally be sanctioned by other states' modifying or taking away any Type I rule that benefits the violator. A reprisal is an action that would be illegal standing alone but becomes legally privileged when used to deter or punish a delict. 22 To put Kelsen's argument in its strongest form, reprisals are both necessary and sufficient in providing the coercion that makes international law really "law."
The international system of reprisals is governed by Type II rules. One of the Type II rules, as it has been honed by custom over centuries, provides that the Type I rule selected as the reprisal mechanism need not be substantively related to the original Type I delict. Relatedness is desirable but not required (as we will see below in the Iranian hostages example). There are three other Type II factors that are more important than relatedness: necessity, proportionality, and efficacy. These factors may seem vague, and yet they have been fleshed out by the many thousands of instances of reprisal that have occurred in international relations over the centuries. Indeed it is noteworthy that states seem to have had little difficulty over the years in perceiving when the combination of 21 HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 34 (1948) . 22 Since the otherwise useful term "countermeasure" can include lawful retaliations (such as reducing foreign aid), it is perhaps overbroad for present purposes. A reprisal is a specific term of art that privileges an otherwise illegal act.
the three factors are satisfied in a given reprisal action. If a reprisal is perceived to go beyond the three factors, states consider it to be a new delict.
A preliminary objection should be raised here-the kind a student impatiently evolution of states. They all represent interests (or entitlements) of states and people.
The many-state game has led to the importance of rules for their own sake rather than as disposables in the politics of power.
While the coerciveness of international norms may check the legal realists, it does not checkmate them. They simply do not take international law seriously. At least some international scholars should accept the challenge of providing a full-fledged theory of international law. Those whose interests are instead directed at specific areas should at least attempt to connect up their research to the current theory dialogue. The theory of international law is not just another research area within the field; rather, it is an organizing conceptualization that can provide coherence-and, dare I say it, legitimacyto any given book or article. Like any part of a hologram, each particular article should contain information about the whole. This information comes from a commonality of questions presented. The questions that the researcher asks about the narrowest of subjects are just reflections of the needed inquiry: what are the rules and norms, where do they come from, and why and how do they work.
